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   Abstract 
 
Throughout the Early Modern times, European dynastic states started a long-term 
process towards the building of a territorial organization, depending on increasing 
revenues and creating its own self-sustaining logics. Different solutions were found to 
face expenditures; hence different paths to fiscal efficiency came up. This paper brings 
up the Portuguese case to add new issues to the debate of the factors for fiscal 
innovation and political-military efficiency in Early Modern times. 
Prior to the Spanish Secession war, the Portuguese state had faced the Spanish armies 
in the 14th century and again in the 17th century. Both wars triggered fiscal innovations, 
shaping the Portuguese fiscal system for centuries afterwards.  
Taking as benchmarks 1580 and 1680, this paper questions the choice for an income 
tax precisely at a time when excises were being generalized in North-western Europe. 
It makes an assessment of state revenues and of the role of this income tax (décima) on 
a comparative approach. The endurance of décima, as had happened to medieval 
excises, will be questioned taking into account cost-benefit considerations, regarding 
the costs (economic and political issues) of any change in collection and assessment. 
It will be argued that there are good examples of fiscal innovation in the Portuguese 
case. However, the importance of fiscal innovation for the process of state making and 
financial modernization may be overestimated just where institutional rigidities had 
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In the early modern period, European political units attempted deep transformations which 
brought about a new model of organisation firstly described by Joseph Schumpeter as the Tax 
State.2 The concept refers to changes in the type of state revenues, which carried a reduction in 
domain revenues and the subsequent emergence of fiscal income. In the long-run such a change 
would be accompanied by the increase of indirect taxation, granting the financial success of the 
fiscal state. It is safe to say that, in the last quarter of the 17th century, the English and Dutch fiscal 
systems relied heavily on indirect taxation. This change underpinned new public debt management 
which was of greater importance to the modernisation of the financial structures of the state. The 
elasticity of receipts provided by indirect taxation supported a growing public deficit and enabled the 
state to earn credibility as a debtor3. These fiscal and financial transformations, since they led to the 
self-sustaining growth of public budgets, supported a superior level of “stateness” and gave the 
pattern to define a modern state4. 
Fiscal History has been considering different coexisting fiscal systems in Early Modern Europe, 
thus avoiding a teleological analysis. Nonetheless, concepts such as domain state, tax state and 
fiscal-military state are to describe different paths towards the common outcome referred above. 
Regardless of such divergent national paths, war seems to have been the predominant factor for 
                                                     
1 Paper submitted and presented at Third Iberian Economic History Workshop: IBEROMETRICS III, Valencia, March 23 
and 24, 2007. 
2 Joseph SCHUMPETER, “The Crisis of the Tax State”, in SWEDBERG, R. (ed), The Economics and Sociology of 
Capitalism, Princeton, 1991, pp. 99-140. 
3 For all see, P.G.M. DICKSON, The Financial Revolution in England: a study in the development of public credit,1688-
1756, London, Macmillan, 1967; Patrick O’BRIEN, Philip A. HUNT, “England, 1485-1815”, in Richard BONNEY 
(ed), The Rise of the Fiscal State in Europe, c.1200-1815, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1999, pp. 52-100; John 
BREWER, The Sinews of Power. War, Money and the English State, 1688-1783, New York, Alfred A. Knopf, 1989; 
Forrest CAPIE, “The Origins and Development of Stable Fiscal and Monetary Institutions in England” in Michael 
BORDO, Roberto CORTÉS-CONDE, Transferring Wealth and Power  from the Old to the New World. Monetary and 
Fiscal Institutions in the 17th through the 19th centuries, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, pp. 19- 58; Jan DE 
VRIES, “The Netherlands in the New World. The legacy of European fiscal, monetary and trading institutions for the 
New World Development, from the Seventeenth to the Nineteenth centuries” in Michael BORDO, Roberto CORTÉS-
CONDE, Transferring Wealth and Power from the Old to the New World. Monetary and Fiscal Institutions in the 17th 
through the 19th centuries, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, pp.100-139; Marjolein C.’T HART, The making of 
a Bourgeois State. War, Politics and Finance during the Dutch Revolt, Manchester, New York, Manchester University 
Press, 1993. 
4 R. BONNEY, W.M. ORMROD, “Introduction. Crises, Revolutions and Self-Sustained Growth: towards a conceptual 
model of change in Fiscal History”, in W.M. ORMOROD, M.BONNEY, R. BONNEY, Crises, Revolutions and Sefl-







the self-sustaining growth of the state, even in the 20th century.5 On the other hand, as the state 
captured the monopoly of defence, the evolution of the fiscal constitution of European states in 
recurring situations of war defined the functional boundaries between the public and private sectors. 
This process occurred through conflicts with other, comparable and competitive powers, both 
internally and externally. But it also demanded consensus through recognising the necessary role of 
alliances between the monarch and ruling elites. From such an imbalance between conflict and 
consensus, came the success, or lack of it, of each national case. Successful cases were those 
which defended themselves from disintegrating or agglutinating forces, and this resistance forged 
the financial bases of their assertion6. 
The association of the state building to the provision of public goods such as defence allowed 
taxation to be thought of as a cost of protection7. This idea is central to the argument raised in this 
article which deals with fiscal innovation. However, it attempts to dismantle the conceptual link 
between fiscal innovation, modernisation process, and conditions for the success of a state in 
warfare. It is argued that a state can be successful when defending the sovereignty over a territory 
with stable boundaries and providing good examples of fiscal innovation, although without achieving 
higher levels of political centralisation and administrative effectiveness, or monopolizing defence. In 
such cases fiscal innovations might have been a factor for the endurance of a non-modernized 
institutional framework, whether referring to the relationship between interest groups and the state, 
the central and local political structures, or the structure of revenues8. If an innovation fails in its 
main purpose and thus having limited impact on the modernization of political and financial 
organizations, the financial alternatives of the state may include the privatisation of public services 
and goods (creating new economic opportunities for rent seeking behaviour) or legitimizing 
methods of expropriating property, which hinders the making of an institutional framework that 
grants property rights.  
The factors for an innovation not providing expected financial results raises the question of 
costs of fiscal compliance during the Early Modern period and focuses on internal, rather than on 
external, challenges in the making of a fiscl state. This analysis uses Portugal to illustrate the 
discussion. It considers an income tax known in Portugal as the décima. Introduced in 1641, during 
the second war of independence in Portuguese of history (the first under went in 1383-1385), the 
tax remained for a period beyond that which justified it, becoming a common revenue of the state 
long after 1820. The décima when introduced, not only altered the Portuguese fiscal system, but 
                                                     
5 R. MUSGRAVE, Fiscal Systems, New Haven- London, Yale University Press, 1969, pp. 106-109. 
6 Ch. TILLY, “Reflections on the History of European State making”, in Ch. TILLY (ed.) The Formation of National 
States in Western Europe, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1975, p. 42. 
7 Edward AMES; Richard T. RAPP, “The Birth and Death of Taxes: a hypothesis”, Journal of Economic History, vol. 
XXXVII, nº1, 1977, pp. 161- 178. 







also represented a precursor case of an income tax, as it was later tested in the 18th century Europe 
already under the influence of the Physiocratic theoreticians.  
The financial effects of the new tax are at the core of the inquiry, although the financial spill 
over of the new tax is collateral to the central issue. Since any fiscal innovation has costs of tax-
operating, and considering the fact that in any society “taxation is regarded as potentially 
objectionable”9, it is to be accessed the failure or success of the fiscal innovation regarding its 
costs, both of compliance and administrative costs, although the former reinforced the latter. Hence, 
the limits of a taxpayer’s compliance are to be questioned taking for granted that he would find an 
opportunity cost in the new tax. Such an approach considers the relationship between a war tax, 
seen as a protection cost, and a certain level of risk in the economy during a time of greater 
insecurity. 
The hypothesis considers the new tax rate would be too high relative to other forms of 
taxpayer’s protection, including that of having no protection whatsoever if war damages were zero. 
The notion of extortion is not relevant, even in the sense of Frederic Lane’s concept of tribute, 
because it is not being discussed whether the expected yields of the new tax were to exceed the 
military expenditure. This hypothesis presumes there is a tension between fiscal needs oriented by 
military expenditure and the actual level of damages caused by that same military staff in different 
sectors of the economy.  In short, war might have been too expensive for the level of economic 
disturbance it caused, and the tax might have affected differently landed and moneyed classes. In 
the absence of a collective feeling of a national community, the state had to face resistances and 
solve the tension through adjustments around a “just rate”. 
This hypothesis is tested by calculating the rate of risk of the economy considering damages 
during wartime in agricultural and maritime sectors. The plausibility of the results shall be gauged by 
the difference between forecast tax yields and actual tax yields.  
The first section presents the Portuguese fiscal system as it developed until the Portuguese 
integration in the Habsburg monarchy, in order to have the context of the fiscal innovation triggered 
by the war of independence in 1640. Having presented the context in which the décima had been 
introduced into the Portuguese fiscal system, the paper considers yields generated by the tax as a 
fundamental problem. In the second section the available data are analysed to assess the 
constraints of collecting the new tax. The third section looks, succinctly, at state budgets from 1640 
to 1680, a decade after the war ending, to gauge the effects of the fiscal innovation on levels of 
stateness. The conclusion evaluates some topics to emphasize the relationship between taxation, 
war and modernization of the state. 
                                                     
9 R. BONNEY, “Revenues”, in R. BONNEY (ed), Economic Systems and State Finance, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 








2. The Portuguese fiscal system 
 
When discussing the Portuguese fiscal system, it is of vital importance to consider its Iberian 
context and recognise the threat of Castile in the creation of the Portuguese state. Portugal’s 
boundaries were defined at the end of the 13th Century. However, the dynastic policies of 
consecutive Iberian royal houses would place Portugal’s independence under threat at two key 
moments during the formation of its fiscal system. The first threat occurred in 1383, causing a war 
against Castile following a crisis of succession. The winning side was opposed to handing the 
Portuguese throne to a Castilian consort and the crisis was solved by installing a new dynasty. The 
second threat occurred between 1578 and 1580. Without a significant rising of Castilian troops, the 
legitimate rights of Felipe II Habsburg were recognised and he was proclaimed king of Portugal in 
1581. Following 60 years of dynastic union, a coup d’état provoked a war of independence which 
was to last 28 years. Considering these facts, it can be suggested that from 1383 to 1640, the 
existence of Portugal as an independent kingdom was jeopardised, deliberately, due to royal 
matrimonial policy. If the coup of 1640 brought about a break with the past, it was the period of the 
dynastic union that would be decisive for the Portuguese fiscal constitution after 1640.  
The integration of Portugal in the Habsburg Empire (1581) meant that Madrid ran a kingdom 
other than Castile with colonial dominions. Due to this peculiarity, when evaluating the financial 
resources of each kingdom included in the Habsburg monarchy, Portugal was work 2 million 
ducats, whilst Flanders, the second richest region was worth 1.8 million ducats. The Portuguese 
empire, with its Indian and Atlantic possessions was given as the reason for such extraordinary 
income10. 
There is no doubt that the empire shaped the Portuguese fiscal system. Direct taxation is 
almost imperceptible in Portuguese budgets, thus distinguishing this case from that of other 
European kingdoms, and revealing an Iberian pattern11. However, in Portugal the royal revenues of 
the empire consisted of royal selling of rights over commercial routes and monopolies as much as 
levying taxes on goods at customs houses such as Casa da India in Lisbon.  Such a presence of 
the imperial economy in the regal taxation system makes the Portuguese case an entrepreneurial 
variant of the domain state12. Thus the high incomes generated from the spice trade, African gold 
and slaves, largely explain the low tax burden levied by the state within the kingdom itself. However 
the empire was somewhat reflected in the kingdom taxation as it contributed to fill the coffers with 
                                                     
10 A .DOMINGUEZ ORTIZ, Política y Hacienda de Felipe IV, Madrid, Ediciones Pegaso, 2nd ed., 1983, pp. 152-153. 
11 G. TORTELLA, F. COMÍN, “Fiscal and Monetary Institutions in Spain (1600-1900)”, Michael BORDO; Roberto      
     CORTÉS-CONDE, Transferring Wealth and Power  from the Old to the New World... p. 146. 







customs duties, since Portugal’s foreign trade with Europe was largely based on re-exporting. This 
particular feature of the Portuguese external flows shaped the fiscal system from the turn of the 15th 
century to the 16th century, reinforcing the position of customs and excise as a major source of 
income, which the state never disposed of, despite having handed over its collection to a system of 
tax farming13. In the last decade of the 16th century and first years of the 17th, customs and other 
fiscal revenues exacted from maritime sectors were about 33 to 35% of the total taxes collected in 
the kingdom, whereas the rights of the crown over the empire (monopolies and selling rights of 
slave trade) almost equal the total revenues of the kingdom (Graph I, Table IV). 
When considering revenues strictly generated within the boundaries of the kingdom, maritime 
duties reflect the impact of international trade on the income of the state more than the openness of 
the economy, which might have remained quite disintegrated from the international market, 
notwithstanding this topic deserving further research.  
The taxation system within the almoxarifado framework (administrative and fiscal units) 
demonstrates, in principle, internal circulation, local transactions levied with a sales tax, the sisa, 
that provided the bulk of revenues for this category in the budgets. Sisa was the equivalent of the 
alcabala enforced in Castile. Both taxes were mediaeval in origin14. In Portugal, the sisa became 
the first universal tax (that is, not strictly local or at a county level and destined to fund central 
government expenses) during the war against Castile in 1383-5. Contrary to the norm in other 
European states suffering financial constraints caused by war, an indirect tax was levied in 
mediaeval times in Portugal. This reveals, as occurred with the alcabala, the importance of the 
market in the Iberian economy which was without parallel in mediaeval Europe. 
The introduction of the sisa within a context of war in the Middle Ages gave three structuring 
characteristics to the Portuguese fiscal system. The first considers the peculiarity of a tax originally 
collected at a local level which then became a “national” tax. This transformation had to be 
approved in the Cortes and reveals a political and constitutional framework that allowed the transfer 
of revenues from “periphery” to the administrative centre. The second characteristic points to the 
symbolism of this transfer when it assumed the guise of a donation of the subjects to their king, 
meaning that this tax was never included in the numerous rewards the king granted to the nobility, 
alienating some fiscal and segneurial rights sanctioned in cartas de foral (town charters). The third 
characteristic is related to the fact that in spite of those constitutional constraints, this tax became 
part of the ordinary income of the state, which would explain complains of the people in the Cortes 
pointing out the origins of this tax as a donation and insisting that it should be abolished (or that it 
should return to its initial local characteristics). The monarchs of the House of Aviz (1383-1580) 
                                                     
13 V.M.GODINHO, “Finanças públicas e estrutura do Estado” in Ensaios II, Lisboa, Sá da Costa, 1978, pp. 31-74; J. 
CORDEIRO PEREIRA, Portugal na Era de Quinhentos, Cascais, Patrimónia Histórica, 2003. 







maintained their sovereign power in this matter and always declined any such requests. 
Nonetheless, they did negotiate a reform which would transfer its collection to the municipalities as 
an alternative to central management. The administration of the sisa, from 1565 onwards, remained 
in the hands of local oligarchies, opening new relationships with the centre through a locally paid 
fixed sum (encabeçamento).15 The encabeçamento ( or the cabeção da sisa) fully resembled any 
system of quotas for collecting direct taxes, as that established in England with the Monthly 
Assessment taxes, or in the Netherlands with the Staat van Oorlog, a kind of a petition to the 
Provinces16.  
This balancing act between centralised tax raising but conceding its administration to local 
authorities reflects a pact between king and subjects in which the state was built, again similar to 
what was happening in Castile17. Such a “pactist” constitution would smooth the coercion character 
of taxation as well as preventing the state from easily raising extraordinary money.  
Through the fiscal enforcement of the encabeçamento, the mediaeval innovation was de-
characterised because revenues coming from the almoxarifados and registered as such in the 
budgets were deceptive with regards to the strict definition of the sisa as an indirect tax. On the one 
hand, encabeçamento has been seen as a regression in terms of Stateness18. It is true that the 
revenue lost its flexibility, as it became subject to contractual review every three to six years and the 
sums agreed for each of those contracts would guide future negotiations. No wonder such lump-
sums loose their relationship to the actual economic base of the tax. However, this negotiation 
between central and local government did not necessarily penalise the central treasury because 
there is evidence on the encabeçamento of the sisa enforcing the local authority to create new ways 
of raising money in order to achieve the sums stipulated in the contract, as it happened in Coimbra. 
Thus, 30 to 60% of the value of the lump-sum (cabeção) was raised through direct taxation on 
movables and profits of any trade19. The tax lien which local authorities now controlled worked to 
the benefit of central government. Had tax farming of the various areas of the sisa continued to be 
controlled by the central government, it was highly probable that the revenue would not have been 
as high as it was with the new system.  
                                                     
15 António OLIVEIRA, Vida Económica e Social de Coimbra de 1537 a 1640, Coimbra, Faculdade de Letras da 
Universidade de Coimbra, 1972, vol. I, pp. 298-320. 
16  J.V. BECKETT, “Land Tax or Excise: the levying of taxation in Seventeenth-and-Eighteenth Century England”, The 
English Historical Review, vol. 100, nº 395, 1985, pp. 285-308; Marjolein C.’T HART, The Making of a Bourgeois 
State…, p. 79. 
16 Bartolomé YUN, Marte contra Minerva. El Precio del Imperio Español. C. 1450-1600, Barcelona, Ed. Crítica, 2004 
17 Bartolomé YUN, Marte contra Minerva. … p.302; J. ROMERO MAGALHÃES, “Estruturas sociais do enquadramento 
da economia portuguesa: os concelhos”, Notas Económicas, nº 4, 1994. 
18 A. FERREIRA da SILVA, “Finanças Públicas”, P. LAINS, A. FERREIRA DA SILVA, História Económica de 
Portugal, 1800-2000, Lisboa, ICS, vol. I, p. 244. 
19 About 67% in 1605 and 32% in 1617: António OLIVEIRA, Vida Económica e Social de Coimbra…, tables pp. 348 and 







Despite the sisa including a proportion of direct tax on moveable goods, it did not affect real 
estate and certainly had no impact on land. This is the fourth characteristic of the Portuguese fiscal 
system until 1640, which left the land for segneurial taxation, controlled both by the church and the 
nobility.  
The variety of different situations between regions, and within the same region, between 
thresholds, made the sisa difficult to be considered as a strictly indirect tax. Nevertheless, with 
some margins of error, it is possible to assert that the Portuguese fiscal system relied mostly on 
indirect taxes, when considering customs, excise and Lisbon custom-houses, on the one hand, and 
almoxarifados on the other hand as items of state budgets. The determination of Felipe IV to 
increase the cabeção of sisa by 25% in the 1630s, attempting to obtain immediate additional 
income, shows the desperation of the treasury, in a decade in which war in Europe meant expenses 
were far higher than ordinary sources of income in Castile could provide. If the budgets did not 
reveal a critical fall in revenues, it was the urgent need for money that erode a contractual principle 
in place since 1565.  
The extra revenue demanded by Felipe IV would raise nominal income from the sisa cabeção 
to 219,377,500 réis, a nominal sum not critical different from that contracted in 1612. However, the 
royal determination in raising money from sisa inflamed the opposition and justified a surge of riots 
from 1635 to 1637 which would eventually anticipate the noble secession movement of 1640.20 This 
is nothing new, as the ways in which taxation served popular revolt are well known and are not 
always due to over-taxing, but because of changes in the constitutional principles of tax collection. 
Furthermore, if Portugal was seen by Madrid in 1616 as being a rich kingdom thanks to its empire, it 
was also well known that the sustaining of such an empire, especially since the end of the truce with 
the United Provinces in 1621, hindered the transfer of any sum from Lisbon to Castile whereas 
Castilian resources were a  part in military expeditions to Brazil or India. However, demanding more 
from Portugal was to be very expensive for Madrid which would lose the kingdom in 1640.  
Besides the increase in the sisa cabeção and the end of ecclesiastic immunity with the 
enforcement of an ecclesiastic payment of 80.000.000 réis21, other taxes were introduced in order 
to gather 160.000.000 réis to send troops to India. These new fiscal demands, known as real de 
água, was to interfere with taxes managed by the municipalities, when they took the liberty to levy 
meat and wine to respond to unforeseen local expenses, for example. It is impossible to grasp even 
an approximate idea of the sums in question at a nationwide level of the so-called real d’água (tax 
on meat and wine)22. For Lisbon alone it was approximately 35,000,000 réis in the 1640s23. No 
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22 António OLIVEIRA, Movimentos Sociais e Poder em Portugal no século XVII, Coimbra, Instituto de História 
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matter the amounts at stake, the royal imposition was to cause a fierce opposition, perhaps not 
because of its effects on the tax burden, but because of its interference with municipal fiscal 
liberties. Any way, it is possible to gain some idea of the tax burden in place in the 1630s and to find 
out the political fiscal limits of Portugal in the last decades of the Habsburg period.  
The last known budget before these new demands was in 1632. Looking only at income from 
the kingdom itself, revenues totalled 822,546,000 réis with 175,502,000 coming from the 
almofarixados of which over 90% came from the sisa. The state intended to increase the value of 
the cabeção by 25% which would have meant an increase of approximately 43,875,500 réis. It is 
useful to convert these nominal sums to real sums, using the average price of wheat for that year24. 
That general sum of receipts for the kingdom was the equivalent of 63.272.769 kg of wheat. The 
population at the time was approximately 1,650,000, giving estimated taxation revenue of 38 kg per 
person. This estimation may be compared to the tax burden in Ancient Rome, which was about 33 
kg per person. According do R. Bonney, this was greater than that in 16th century England, but 
much less than that in 18th century25. The comparison ignores the increase in agricultural 
productivity. Above all it does not take into account the meaning of such taxation for military 
expenditures which were certainly quite different from Ancient Rome to Habsburg Madrid. The 
exercise aims to build up a value to be used in a broader time scale, for it may be compared to a 
person’s maximum consumption of wheat per year. Assuming the annual consumption of cereal per 
capita to be a minimum of 547 kg and a maximum of 730 kg26, that level of taxation per capita was 
equal to 5% of consumption of wheat. These 38 kg per capita result from a calculation which 
assumes 478,100,000 réis of indirect taxes coming from customs and excise duties, consular 
duties, taxes on salt and fisheries; all revenues which had an impact on different sectors of the 
economy. Only duties on salt and fisheries would have had an impact on consumer goods for the 
majority of the population, which was circumscribed for rural areas of the kingdom (imported wheat 
was exempt from customs duties). Therefore, if the calculation is restricted to the imposition of the 
new sisa cabeção, to reflect how much orders from Madrid increased the tax burden on the majority 
of the population of the kingdom, the calculation should be repeated taking into account only the 
almoxarifado revenues and that which the government estimated it would raise with an additional 
25% on the sisa. The tax collected from the almoxarifado, 175,502,000 réis, places the tax 
threshold at 8,2 kg per capita and the increase of 25% (43,875,500 réis) would add another 2 kg per 
                                                     
24 Price per bushel in 1636: 196 reis (5 years moving average). Each bushel = 15 kg. See data on prices in R. SANTOS, 
Sociogénese do Latifúndio Moderno. Mercado, Crises e Mudança Social na Região de Évora, século XVII a XIX, 
Lisboa, Banco de Portugal, 2003, Appendix 
25 R. BONNEY, “Introduction”, The Rise of the Fiscal State in Europe, c. 1200-1895, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 
1999, p. 9. 
26 Aurélio OLIVEIRA, “A Renda Agrícola em Portugal durante o Antigo Regime (séculos XVII-XVIII). Alguns aspectos 







capita, or approximately one day’s consumption. These values suggest that there was still a 
reasonable economic margin for increases in taxation.  
If the interference in the sisa cabeção provoked strong political upheaval, it should be noted 
that the forecast financial results were relatively modest because the approximately 44 million réis 
would only add 5.3% to the budget. The new taxes of the 1630s were an act of defiance by Madrid 
which caused serious political turmoil and little financial return. From this tension caused in the 
1630s, the Portuguese elite were left with the notion that the sisa cabeção was a source of little 
flexibility for future settlements. As soon as the war of independence required extraordinary income, 
the sisa was seen as an old tax and its purpose was a “donation” which had had its day in 1383. 
The revolt of December 1640 drew Portugal into a war against the Habsburgs that would last 
28 years. The costs of this bid for independence were debated in the Cortes of 1641 which 
requested 720.000.000 réis. Soon after, it was to be proven insufficient. The Cortes newly 
convened in 1642 approved expenditure up to 860.000.000 réis.  
If the war demanded an increase in taxation, the way in which to do it had to be different to that 
which Felipe IV had tried in the 1630s especially as the political speech of the promoters of the 
coup d’État (a peculiar coalition of nobility and the clergy) exaggerated accusations of extortion by 
the Habsburgs. With this political argument, preached from the pulpits, popular approval for the 
revolt was achieved, but the state would lose room to manoeuvre in order to better explore sources 
of income already known. It is also worth mentioning that the empire was under fire from the Dutch 
in the Atlantic and in the Indian Ocean which affected income from the empire as well as customs 
duties.  
Between 1641 and 1642, during the most turbulent years of the revolution, an ambitious fiscal 
reform was undertaken. The first universal direct tax was introduced. This was, without doubt, a 
fiscal innovation. Above all, the base of the tax was entirely new, both in economic and political 
terms. The universal income tax was levied on rental, profits, interests and wages and it was to 
affect the landed classes, which was totally new in what concerned the relationship of the state with 
the social elites. The enforcement of the tax required members of the local government to be 
supervised by officials nominated by the king represented in a central body known as the Junta dos 
Três Estados (Council of the Three Estates) which gathered members of the three social estates 
present in the Cortes: the church, nobility and the Third Estate27. 
In the context of the Portuguese fiscal system, the décima was an innovation as important as 
the sisa had been in 1383. However it was the concept of a taxable income as well as its 
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implications for the administration of such a tax which provided the characteristics of a fiscal 
revolution: the creation of a tax collection structure controlled by central government, never liable to 
be part of tax farming and with the intention of imposing a rate of 10% on net incomes. There were 
two exceptions, one for the individual members of the clergy, who were exempted (although the 
social estate, as a whole, was not) and the other for those depending exclusively on their wages, 
who were levied at a rate of 2%.  
This innovation raises interesting issues regarding the political and economic culture which 
cannot be discussed in this paper. However, it is important to emphasis the modernity of the 
concept of a net income, which was mentioned indirectly in the regulations of 1642 and 1656 (still 
cited as the fundamental text of regulation of the décima in 1762 legislation). “Net” income, as the 
base of the new tax, was already an idea explicit in one of the reports the king collected from his 
counsellors of state in 1642 in the hesitative stages of the implementation of this fiscal reform28. 
The décima represented a notable fiscal burden (graphs II, III) placing the budget at a height 
never before reached for strictly domestic income sources (Graph I). By 1656, that increase was 
90% due to the décima, a revenue entirely devoted to expenses with the war of independence. Only 
later, through the royal monopoly of  tobacco was the budget balanced with 290.000.000 réis (table 
IV). 
Once the details of the fiscal reform are known, it is fundamental to emphasise that amounts 
forecasted were never raised. This may support the hypothesis that any fiscal reform in a time of 
war could have been condemned to failure. The next section discusses this issue and assesses the 
financial results of the fiscal innovation. 
 
 
2. Was there a failure? 
 
The introduction of the décima was based on the mediaeval principle of a donation by the 
people to the king for the defence of the realm. During the war, especially between 1640 and 1654, 
the central government would launch a powerful propaganda machine, evoking a common 
fatherland, fruit of a dynasty which shared the blood of the founder of the Portuguese monarchy. 
This inheritance had to be defended from the Castilian menace. The pactist nature of the 
government was reinforced. The assumed temporary character of the new tax forced the Cortes to 
be convened on a three-yearly basis where the new tax would be renewed for a further period of 
time. However, the legitimacy, the fiscal constitutionality of the tax or problems of enforcement were 
never discussed in the Cortes. Nonetheless, the geographic distribution of the defensive effort was 
                                                     







unequal and there were times in which protests could be heard in the Cortes against the demands 
of the war, especially regarding conscription. It had been argued that there was an unintentional 
double taxation: the tax itself and military service29.     
The war demanded a fiscal effort to the order of 87.755.102 kg of wheat30, i.e., 53 kg per 
capita, which was, without doubt, a considerable increase in comparison to the period of dynastic 
union. Considering the calculations made above, strictly in relation to the sisa, it was possible to 
extrapolate that the economy of the kingdom would allow increases in taxation and the war placed 
the level of taxation on the economy of the kingdom (almoxarifados and décima) at 61 kg (say, 8.6% 
- 11.3% of consumption). These estimates serve to analyse the point to which resources existed in 
the kingdom for the effort demanded and, in fact, the rate of 10% was not inadequate to raise 
860.000.000 réis. On the other hand, it stresses the previously low level of taxation per capita in 
Portugal. 
The estimates for the money to be raised through the new décima were probably guided by the 
experience of the church with the collection of the dízimo (ecclesiastical tithe) and here is the 
explanation for such an accurate estimation of the money to be raised from an incidence rate of 
10% two months after the coup (without a new administration having been formed). Furthermore, 
this same ecclesiastical income was included in the base of the tax which was, from the beginning, 
universal (in the sense that it concerned the three social estates convened in Cortes). 
Contemporary documents show that the administration of the treasury knew the revenue of the 
church to be around 640.000.000 réis and the main source of this income was the dízimo31. Despite 
one of the counsellors of state having alerted the king in 1642 to the fact that the dízimo was based 
on gross income and what was being levied was based on net income, he also advised that it was 
important that dizimo (tithe) collectors should be part of the administration of the tax to provide 
information on each location. The adoption of administrative practices, well known in the church, 
seemed to be the way forward for the implementation of this new fiscal innovation, thus lowering the 
administrative costs of the reform. 
If it was not the problem of over-evaluation of the base of the tax which hampered collection of 
the forecasted amounts, the tax rate, understood to be a protection charge, provides another 
perspective on the difficulties the State had to overcome to implement the system. It is to be asked 
whether the risks of the economy in a time of war were critically under this rate. Different 
perceptions of risk either due to the region of the country or the type of income most affected by the 
war, create a number of possible scenarios for the tax to be considered excessive, explaining the 
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resistance to its collection at the intended rate, which, in  turn, may tell why the forecasted amounts 
were note actually collected. The proximity of the taxpayer to the political centre would have its role, 
since he had political means to react against what he would consider extortion. However it is 
necessary to widen the analysis of the problem beyond difficulties of collection due to the presumed 
ineffectiveness of the coercive structures of the state and to find out the economic boundaries of the 
resistance through risk assessment. 
Following this hypothesis, the tax rate is compared with the risk rate of the economy, analysing 
firstly the behaviour of the agricultural sector in a region representative of the risk of war, bearing in 
mind the unequal geographical distribution of members of the armed forces.  
The Alentejo is the most representative region as a battleground. For strictly logistical reasons 
of troop manoeuvres and military tactics, it was the part of the kingdom most susceptible to invasion 
and that which suffered the most intense campaigns of the 28-year war. It was here that 50% of the 
infantry and 73% of the cavalry were stationed. In financial terms, the Alentejo province consumed 
71% of expenses as the war was purely defensive, not offensive, with the memory of 1580 fresh in 
the mind of military strategists when Lisbon was easily taken by the Duke of Alba, who didn’t find 
resistance to the entry of the armies through the Alentejo border. In comparison, the sea fortresses 
of the Lisbon / Cascais, Peniche and Setúbal coasts consumed only 1.7% of war expenditure32.         
There is no place here for an analysis of expenses as the focus is on revenues. This summary 
picture of military resource distribution intends to prove that the Alentejo was the region of the 
kingdom that was subjected to the greatest pressure within a framework of notable inequality. 
Where, in order to assess the impact of the war on the agricultural sector, the behaviour of 
revenues in the area is a good proxy for the instability of the sector.  
The data allowing the calculation of an average rate of damage to agriculture result from the 
behaviour of the rental market in 31 properties in the Alentejo. Two series are available to be 
analysed jointly, using 1640 to 1679 as benchmarks33. One of the series contains the contract-
specified rents; the other contains the rents actually paid, with this difference being the result of a 
number of loss-making situations which caused the tenant to negotiate a reassessment of the rent 
with the landlord. The causes of this disparity between nominal and actual rents are not 
systematically available, but environmental factors were to interfere alongside war damages. Rui 
Santos estimated the risk in the sector as being 10%, whilst using other variables which were not 
strictly the difference between nominal and actual rents. The author created an index for which the 
number of situations where alterations in one party of the contract was also considered as a risk 
factor in the rental market34. For the purposes of this paper, only the reduction in rent is seen as 
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significant as it defines the value of the damages of war. It is also intended to compare the risk in 
this sector with the risk at sea where such contractual variables are not considered (it is unknown 
how the rotation of contracts between shipmasters and freighters interfered in the economics 
shipping, and it is also unknown whether such rotation was a variable depending on greater levels 
of insecurity). 
For this type of analysis, the contracted rents and the actual rents is data for an estimate of a 
ratio taking the sum of discounted damages and the sum of discounted rents at a fixed rate of 
6.25% (the discount rate based on the nominal interest rate) over a time period of 29 years (strictly 
considering the period of war) and over a time range of 40 years (considering the period after the 
war ended, and during which the tax became part of the ordinary revenues of the state)35. 
The calculation estimates a rate of damages of 4.69 % for the period of the war (1640-68) and 
of 4.35% for the 40-year period between 1640 and 1679 (Tables I, II-a). The years of peace, when 
analysed separately, show a damage rate of 1.39 % which is certainly the result of bad harvests 
(table II- b). From this exercise, based on the main field of conflict in the country, the conclusion is 
war could affect the rent approximately 4.7%. If such is the case, the compliance of the landlords to 
the new tax was conditioned by this level of risk, since it meant the tax had an opportunity cost 
around 5.3%. 
If on the land border the adversary was the Habsburg, the enemy at sea were forces also 
considered as rebels by the Habsburgs. The war between Portugal and the United Provinces 
although never formally declared, intensified in the 1640s, prolonged a situation which began in 
1624 when the Dutch West India Company (WIC) assaulted São Salvador da Bahia and then 
started the occupation of a significant part of the sugar producing region in Brazil in 1630. The 
Dutch piracy inflicted serious damages on the Portuguese fleet in the Brazilian Atlantic. In only two 
years (1647 and 1648), 108 ships were lost (see table III for sources). It is certain that this high 
number of casualties had repercussions on customs and excise duties as a large part of the cargo 
would have been sugar, essential for re-export and a source of revenue, paying 3% on entry and 
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another 3% on exit. In addition to this excise tax, another tax was added to sugar to subsidise the 
war and would raise approximately 6.400.000 réis36. 
From the information on casualties of ships afloat (type and number of ships lost), an average 
damage rate has been calculated, considering setting out costs (as an indicator of crew wages), 
freight rates and value of cargo (Table III). The calculation used was identical to that of the rents, 
although taking into account the different discount rate throughout the period, as credit was subject 
to rules of the bottomry loan contracts37. This exercise gives a damage rate in the order of 11.8%, 
which is quite close both to the rate of the décima and to the insurance premiums underwritten by 
Portuguese merchants in Hamburg  who covered the risk of voyages, back and forth,  Lisbon and 
Bahia or Rio de Janeiro38. A Memorial written between 1630 and 1635 claims that the annual 
average loss of Portuguese ships was 35, because of the enemy’s ability to plunder. The author of 
this memorial asserts that the risk at sea forced the Portuguese to insure in Hamburg, where an 
insurance premium of 10% was charged39. It can be stated that war at sea was perceived as 
causing high damages and it incited economic agents to seek different protection structures given 
the absence of a royal escort to the fleet. As far as the maritime sector was concerned, the new tax 
had a “just rate”.  
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No information is available regarding the structure of the GDP to gauge the collateral effects of 
the maritime risk in the economy. Assuming the structure of the sate revenues tells roughly the 
share of the maritime sector in the economy, data of the 1660 budget leads to an estimation of 22% 
as the share of the maritime sector (customs, including consulado, salt and fisheries). If this share is 
taken into account by educated guesswork it is plausible that the risk of the economy did not 
surpass 6% (actually, the interest rate legally fixed ), which leads again to the conclusion that the 
tax was over-rated. 
More relevant, however, is the fact that war affected differently the sectors of the economy and 
thus landed classes were confronted with a fiscal burden higher than the rate of damages in their 
lands. Despite the war of independence being decided on the border, namely on the Alentejo and 
Beira Baixa fronts, the overall picture is that disturbances in the agricultural sector were restricted to 
few years, namely from 1662 to 1665, which were not sufficient to approximate the risk rates to the 
tax rate. Although the question about which social groups and sectors of the economy carried the 
tax burden has no precise answers40, it can be taken as more than a mere impression that in 
Portugal the landed classes paid for the war more than the mercantile class, becoming the social 
and economic context for the costs of compliance of this fiscal innovation. Even if the calculations 
overestimated the share of the sea in the national income, the conclusions are not affected by this 
lack of precision: proportionally to damages suffered, the interest groups connected with maritime 
traffic should not consider the tax an extortion, whilst claiming for a royal escort to the fleets. 
The calculations which show a gap of approximately 5 percentage points between the risk and 
tax rate for the landed classes are confirmed by documents produced by the Junta dos Três 
Estados. Despite dealing with the foundation of the Fiscal State, supposedly the organisation which 
would have produced the greatest number of documents in the Early Modern Period, this assertion 
is totally wrong in a Portuguese context. The difficulties come precisely from this point, that is, in the 
failure of the Treasury to maintain systematic records. Therefore, such a lack of information speaks 
for itself when considering the low level of stateness of the Portuguese society.  
The sparse information available is based on circumstantial reports of the sums evaluated for 
assessment and what was enforced. They reveal two levels of disagreement relating to the sums 
sanctioned by the Cortes which, in their turn, were dictated by expenditure needs. The first level of 
disagreement, of small importance, is based on what local administrators of the tax declared as 
being taxable, or assessed. It should be emphasised that they did not declare sums much lower 
than the ceilings decreed by the Cortes. The second level of disagreement is related to that which 
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was actually enforced with the balance being negative between the amount assessed and the 
amount raised, seen as taxpayer indebtedness.  
The Junta dos Três Estados carried out an audit to serve as an illustration to the Cortes of 
1652 as justification for the need to maintain the tax for the following three years. It demonstrated 
that the revenue authorised in 1646 of 860.000.000 réis was in part reached through the levy of 
décima, which guaranteed up to 680.000.000 réis, and the remainder would be obtained from new 
indirect taxes, some of which had been attempted by Felipe IV but had given rise to civil unrest (the 
real d’água, tax on officeholders salaries - the “meia anata”, new duties on sugar). A part from these 
indirect taxes, the additional 180.000.000 réis included rents from properties expropriated by the 
crown (which until 1657 were properties confiscated from noble houses sided with the Habsburgs) 
and a contribution from the house of Braganza itself, which, despite being the noble house of the 
king (the former duke of Braganza), it was never incorporated into the crown estates41. Despite 
these contributions, the essential costs of the war would have been financed to the tune of 81% by 
the décima. The table below shows various documents prepared by the Junta dos Três Estados for 
the Cortes of 1652 and considered only the enforcement of the décima. 
 
 
                                                        Enforcement of the Décima 




Annual Shortfall (réis) Enforcement Rate 
(%) 
1641-1649 397.457.830 5.440.000.000 
 
630.317.771 7 
1650 502.687.269 680.000.000 177.312.731 74 
1651 454.703.986 680.000.000 225.296.014 67 
1652 196.616.914 680.000.000 483.383.086 29 
1653 523.324.540 680.000.000 156.675.460 77 
 
 
The hiatus between sums collected and those approved by the Cortes determined the 
calculation of the enforcement rate as shown in the table. That ineffectiveness during the first 
decade (1641-1649) invokes administrative hindrances, being the administrative staff in an 
embryonic phase. The small rate of enforcement caused a serious increase of the public debt since 
the sate contracted short-term loans to merchants whose capital was funded to the décima receipts. 
In 1650’s the system was already in motion. The enforcement may be a proxy of costs of 
compliance. Unfortunately this document only separates the receivables for 1650. However, when 
                                                     







used as an exemplifying year, it is possible to confirm that the enforcement rate of the tax varied 
depending on the categories specified. In total, 638.229.049 réis were assessed (very similar to the 
660.000.000 réis fixed since 1646) of which only 502.687.269 réis were actually collected, as 
featured in the above table. Hence, the assessment operation placed taxable income very close to 
the forecast threshold, supporting the theory that the scarcity of revenues was not due to the 
taxable base shrinking but to resistance to enforcement. This would have been known by the 
centrally employed officers charged with administering the tax alongside the local collection officers. 
This is a very different situation from that usual in England when the Land Tax was at stake. Here, 
the under assessment was the main cause for the decrease of yields, or for a gap between 
amounts expected and actual revenues. Being that so, assessment was fiercely kept in the hands 
of local authorities and was tolerated by the central government as a necessary cost of compliance, 
whereas non-payment would have legal action or government sanctions42. In the Portuguese case, 
the rate of enforcement mirrored the state’s coercion ability as much as the taxpayer resistance to 
pay more than the risks incurred.  
If the resistance factors were due to the difference between risk rates and the tax rate, the 
capacity to react to fiscal demands depended on the “social space” of the taxpayer. It is possible to 
recognise particular social positions in the categories in which the décima budget for 1650 is 
broken-down. Church and nobility, the highest social ranks, appear associated to items in which 
enforcement was mostly critical. The church revenue was assessed at 61.339.004 réis (roughly 
10% of the value of the dízimo at the time). Of that sum, only 29.237.936 réis were collected, 
reducing the rate of enforcement to 47%, which is approximately 4 to 5% of the total income of the 
church dízimo. The military orders also constitute another category specified. Their taxable income 
came from comendas (rents of properties to which the dízimo right and the collection of variable 
privileges was restricted. These rents, in the form of the comendas were one of the ways in which 
the king could ingratiate himself to the high nobility for their services). An income of 5,248,000 réis 
was allocated to this category of which also only 47% of the décima was collected. Next, the Lisbon 
parishes come with the city complying with 69% of the 48,468,774 réis assessed. In all, the regions 
included in as counties / almofarixados, geographically distant from the political centre, show the 
highest rate of enforcement of the tax, with 88% of the 412,277,635 réis of taxable income being 
paid. 
Considering this scenario, in order that this fiscal innovation provided the necessary revenues, 
central government either had to create a repressive machine able to enforce the “debtors” – 
something unadvisable in a time of war and while building a base of legitimacy for a new dynastic 
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house – or adapt its budgets to this difficulty in enforcing tax collection, managing the systematic 
difference between assessment values, actual revenues and expenses. The latter option was that 
chosen. The budgets refer to average revenue “in most years” of 480,000,000 réis (which was 
taken for Graph II)43.  
In brief, 72% of the tax would be collected. Landed social groups were to contribute the most to 
lowering the enforcement at this level. The church, although heavily involved in propaganda 
legitimising the restoration, reflected the sensitivity of landed classes to the new tax. In its 
resistance to the royal treasury, it brought the enforcement rate closer to the risk rate of the 
agricultural sector. Budgetary figures just mirror the consensus between king and subjects around 
7% rate for the décima. 
The submission of the central government, in order to maintain a consensus, shows the limits 
of coercive effectiveness of the state in relation to landed social strata, especially in a revolutionary 
period that used in propaganda a negative image of Habsburg power as a synonym of extortion. 
Such image fed many of the sermons preached in Portuguese churches to encourage popular 
compliance with war. But this necessary pact between state and the elites that intended to serve the 
cause of the revolution by preaching instead of paying the new taxes would have repercussions on 
the national debt, which in 1656 represented 104% of revenue. It is not surprising that in this year, 
the state had to find alternative forms of financing from the foundation of new monopolies, as was 
the case with Brazilian tobacco The visible recovery in place by 1660 (graph II) is due to these new 
property revenues whilst the fall in the 1680s is justified by the reduction in décima revenues once 
the war ended.  
 
 
4. Fiscal innovation and state building 
 
The tax remained after the peace treaty being signed in 1668 despite the people having 
demanded its abolition in the Cortes. They were promised it would be abolished as long as the debt 
contracted with merchants who financed the wars was settled. This debt was due to advances 
having been paid on tax revenues during the decades of conflict with the Habsburgs (1640-68) and 
the Netherlands (1641-61). Due to this debt, conditions were in place for the décima to form a 
permanent part of the Portuguese fiscal constitution, albeit subject to different rates. However no 
changes were made as public finances were still suffering from the calamitous state they had been 
left in when the war of the Spanish Succession justified again a tax rate of 10%.  
                                                     







The accumulation of debts in time of war was nothing new and the detailed debate over 
managing the debt would divert the central theme of this paper to the relationship between the state 
and its merchant creditors. The essence of the décima, during and after the war, was designed to 
serve the debt taken out with these “assentistas”.  It is therefore important to focus on the 
consequences of a fiscal innovation piloted during a period of nation-building and a war of 
independence.  
Firstly, the sharp fall in revenues (graph II – forecast) between 1641 and 1656 demands some 
comments. The available information for this year was produced by the Conselho da Fazenda 
(Treasury) to show the deplorable state of the coffers and how traditional revenues from the 
almofarixados and customs and excise duties were falling. Meanwhile, it was during this period that 
Portugal had a decisive victory over the Dutch, retaking the north east of Brazil following conflict in 
the colony since 1645. The victory was unexpected considering the instability on the Portuguese 
Atlantic routes for sugar and the consequences of the Zeeland piracy on Portuguese customs 
posts. Without going into details on comparative costs between, on the one hand, naval forces 
needed for fleet defence and, on the other, the resources placed at the disposal of the army 
stationed in the Alentejo, it is sufficient to say that Portugal was outnumbered in terms of active 
servicemen in both the navy and army. The Dutch navy possessed 46 vessels and Portugal had no 
more than 2144.             The Dutch had over 30,000 men on their European fronts and Portugal, 
during the entire war effort, which emptied the coffers of the state, had approximately 14,000 
infantrymen and 3600 cavalrymen.  
The inequality of military forces and financial resources shows that war in early modern Europe 
did not always depend on financial power as what was in jeopardy in Brazil – a colony which would 
come to guarantee the bulk of Portuguese tax revenues in the following century – cannot be seen 
from the point of view of what each national power was able to mobilise. In Brazil, the question was 
related to the military capacity of two private companies. Maritime defence was privatised in 
Portugal in 1649 with the creation of a monopoly company  to escort the fleets (Companhia Geral 
do Comércio do Brasil). The WIC surrendered to the navy of this company. The transfer of defence 
to a private company representing merchant interests emphasises one of the results of the financial 
difficulties caused by a fiscal innovation with almost no results for the first decade in which it was 
introduced.  
The privatisation of marine defence was, in truth, a stage in the affirmation of autonomy of the 
Portuguese state which enabled it to distance itself from the concept that a modern state holds a 
defence monopoly. While in other areas, namely symbolic, and not any less decisive for the 
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success of its autonomy, the mobilisation of discursive resources proved itself to be less expensive 
but highly effective, both through irreprehensible diplomacy and through preaching in the pulpits 
providing the religious justification for the war. The resistance of the Church to the payment of taxes 
was not a matter of political opposition to the autonomy of the kingdom. It was just a way of 
bargaining services for the cause, since its preaching services would be no less important for the 
masses to comply with a tax burden quite higher than that Felipe IV had ever tried to enforce45. 
Secondly, it is notable that the 1680 budget had, in real terms, an income threshold equal to 
that of the last decade of the Spanish era (1632). This was a real reduction of the tax burden in 
comparison with 1632 as between 1641 and 1688 GDP is thought as having grew by 0.7% a year46. 
The 28-year war certainly interfered in the Portuguese fiscal constitution and thus the Portuguese 
experience is not different from what happened in any kingdom of Europe, where wars demanded 
fiscal innovation. However, if the budget is a suitable indicator to measure levels of stateness, the 
décima had no visible effects on the budget, although in the long-run, it would enable the State to 
enforce a revenue already institutionalized for military purposes. When new conjunctures of war 
occurred, it was just a matter of altering the rate of the tax as it would happen twice in the 18th 
century.  
Notwithstanding this possibility, Portuguese case adds new insights to other national cases, 
which were submitted to econometric analysis to questioning the relationship between war and 
higher level of political and institutional modernization. The relationship between both phenomena is 
highly positive for cumulative years whereas the effect of particular wars on taxes increases had to 
be very robust to be statistically significant47. Portugal may be a case of state building without the 
challenge of long periods of war, thus remaining with a relative low level of stateness. 
Thirdly, and considering strictly the traditional sources of revenue (fig II), the second half of the 
17th century shows the reduction of their role which, in turn, highlights the importance of other 
sources of income and stresses the features of a domain state, as 47% of new revenues in the 
1680 budget came from the monopoly of Brazilian tobacco. In addition to this, the item identified as 
“royal seizures” reveals the archaic side of the structure of this budget, despite the justification of 
the treasury administration for making this an independent category lying in the two previous 
decades of political upheaval. The other part of this income had its origin in the traditional ways in 
which the Inquisition managed the treasury. In 1674, three of the biggest financiers of the state with 
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assets based on income from the décima, were imprisoned by the Inquisition and their assets were 
handed to the Royal Treasury48.The perpetuation of such actions when obtaining money damaged 
the building of trustworthy relationships between interest groups with financial capital and the state, 
while impeding recognition of the state as guarantor of inviolable property rights.  
Last but not least, the way in which direct taxation entered the Portuguese fiscal system did not 
grant higher levels of stateness. The original ideal of proportionality of the tax lessened with 
alterations in enforcement. The lump-sum of 200,000,000 réis was to be collected using a local 
administrative system having a role similar to that which it had had in collecting the sisa since the 
last quarter of the 16th century.  When combined with the sisa, the new décima placed taxation at 
13.8 kg per capita (or approximately 1.8% of consumption).  
What seems to be structural in the process of building the Portuguese state is rooted in the 
fragility of the administrative network of central government and its repercussions in the low levels 




Last section drew the four lines of thought which question the association of fiscal innovation 
with the construction of superior levels of stateness in a unidirectional progression. In this way, 
successful states, as described by Ch. Tilly, at least until the first half of the 18th century, may 
include socio-political units with a relatively small capacity for fiscal enforcement. Put another way, if 
taxation was not the only way in which the state could capture the available economic resources, 
the potential for fiscal innovation to modernise the state could be relatively negligible and relatively 
independent of the defensive conditions in place. 
This argument was demonstrated by analysing a national case for which the concept of fiscal 
innovation is suitable. First, because it shows examples of the introduction of new taxes to 
subsidise wars of independence or recovery of political autonomy. Second, because any one of 
these taxes interfered in the fiscal constitution. In all, fiscal innovations in the Portuguese case, 
when seen through the dichotomy which shares taxation between direct and indirect taxes, have a 
peculiarity. It is this peculiarity which bestows the Portuguese fiscal system with a divergent 
evolution from other, better studied European cases. Firstly, the sisa: if it was not a specifically 
Portuguese tax, on being introduced as the first universal tax in the kingdom during the Middle Ages 
it already showed specificity to Iberia, whose states complicated sources of revenue creating 
indirect taxes whilst in other, contemporary political entities, direct taxes on assets or goods 
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sustained the growth of royal budgets. Secondly, the décima: a tax which better demonstrates the 
place of the 17th century in European fiscal history as the period of varying solutions to meet the 
ever heavier demands of war. Whilst the Netherlands increased their number of indirect taxes, thus 
confirming the importance of a highly merchant-based economy for the elasticity of fiscal revenues, 
Portugal, similarly dragged into a war against the Habsburgs, introduced a direct, universal income 
tax. As the economy was essentially agricultural, this tax was thought as having a larger base to 
collect the lump-sum needed for the war.  
The balance of this innovation must consider that the tax, at the time of its conception, showed 
undeniable forward-thinking: its universality and a conception of net income (net rent, profits, 
interest and wages). On the other hand, although being the first universal direct tax, its 
legitimization was based on personal ties between subjects  and  a “natural” king, making use of 
proto-nationalistic issues. When taken as a donation to the “natural” king, lower costs of compliance 
could be forecasted. However, such a modern appeal to a collective national feeling did not match 
taxpayer’s interests who dealt with levels of risk much lower than the costs of protection the state 
was charging him. Such a disparity between legitimizing arguments and the limits of taxes within the 
political culture of the Ancien Régime was taken in this paper as a fundamental factor for the actual 
rate of the tax. 
The tension mentioned above, having effects on the enforcement, brings to mind John 
Brewer’s contend on the importance of the timing of any fiscal or political innovation49.The décima 
seems, in truth, out of its time. If seen as the introduction of the first direct universal tax, other 
European states introduced it much earlier, and if seen as universal income tax, it was too soon for 
having the required low operating-costs50.     
 
 
                                                     
49 John BREWER, The Sinews of Power…, p. 24. 
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Table I - Damages on land 
















  68477,02   2980,66 4,35% 
1640 4649,40 4649,40 1 30,00 30,00 0,65% 
1641 5670,10 5336,56 0,9411765 124,40 117,08 2,19% 
1642 2832,10 2508,71 0,8858131 299,80 265,57 10,59% 
1643 5326,70 4440,90 0,8337065 152,30 126,97 2,86% 
1644 2718,69 2133,26 0,7846649 0,00 0,00 0,00% 
1645 5256,00 3881,60 0,7385082 92,90 68,61 1,77% 
1646 5422,60 3769,07 0,6950665 47,80 33,22 0,88% 
1647 5469,80 3578,24 0,6541803 205,90 134,70 3,76% 
1648 5361,51 3301,07 0,6156991 0,00 0,00 0,00% 
1649 5265,46 3051,24 0,5794815 0,00 0,00 0,00% 
1650 5066,90 2763,46 0,5453943 1119,90 610,79 22,10% 
1651 2927,40 1502,67 0,5133123 191,60 98,35 6,55% 
1652 2831,50 1367,95 0,4831175 77,40 37,39 2,73% 
1653 4808,20 2186,28 0,4546988 392,10 178,29 8,15% 
1654 5596,45 2395,01 0,4279518 0,00 0,00 0,00% 
1655 5352,00 2155,67 0,4027782 17,50 7,05 0,33% 
1656 5709,50 2164,39 0,3790853 45,90 17,40 0,80% 
1657 4941,10 1762,92 0,3567862 155,60 55,52 3,15% 
1658 5179,70 1739,34 0,3357988 60,30 20,25 1,16% 
1659 5481,30 1732,34 0,3160459 505,00 159,60 9,21% 
1660 5681,50 1689,99 0,2974550 107,30 31,92 1,89% 
1661 5029,80 1408,13 0,2799576 299,00 83,71 5,94% 
1662 2215,20 583,68 0,2634895 553,90 145,95 25,00% 
1663 3581,60 888,20 0,2479901 672,50 166,77 18,78% 
1664 4637,40 1082,38 0,2334025 923,20 215,48 19,91% 
1665 4090,80 898,64 0,2196729 921,80 202,49 22,53% 
1666 4968,60 1027,26 0,2067510 143,70 29,71 2,89% 
1667 5448,00 1060,12 0,1945892 45,00 8,76 0,83% 
1668 5324,70 975,18 0,1831427 198,80 36,41 3,73% 
1669 5238,50 902,96 0,1723696 25,40 4,38 0,48% 
1670 5403,90 876,68 0,1622303 5,00 0,81 0,09% 
1671 4741,55 723,97 0,1526873 0,00 0,00 0,00% 
1672 4774,18 686,08 0,1437057 0,00 0,00 0,00% 
1673 5224,44 706,62 0,1352524 0,00 0,00 0,00% 
1674 4117,80 524,18 0,1272964 81,20 10,34 1,97% 
1675 4849,56 581,02 0,1198084 0,00 0,00 0,00% 
1676 5354,10 603,73 0,1127608 11,70 1,32 0,22% 
1677 4945,50 524,86 0,1061278 522,70 55,47 10,57% 
1678 4513,40 450,82 0,0998850 264,00 26,37 5,85% 







              Table II – a 
                                   Damages on land: period of war 
                      (Deflated values in bushels of wheat)  
 
  Rents 
Discounted Rens 








  61384,26   2881,98 4,69% 
1640 4649,40 4649,40 1,0000000 30,00 30,00 0,65% 
1641 5670,10 5336,56 0,9411765 124,40 117,08 2,19% 
1642 2832,10 2508,71 0,8858131 299,80 265,57 10,59% 
1643 5326,70 4440,90 0,8337065 152,30 126,97 2,86% 
1644 2718,69 2133,26 0,7846649 0,00 0,00 0,00% 
1645 5256,00 3881,60 0,7385082 92,90 68,61 1,77% 
1646 5422,60 3769,07 0,6950665 47,80 33,22 0,88% 
1647 5469,80 3578,24 0,6541803 205,90 134,70 3,76% 
1648 5361,51 3301,07 0,6156991 0,00 0,00 0,00% 
1649 5265,46 3051,24 0,5794815 0,00 0,00 0,00% 
1650 5066,90 2763,46 0,5453943 1119,90 610,79 22,10% 
1651 2927,40 1502,67 0,5133123 191,60 98,35 6,55% 
1652 2831,50 1367,95 0,4831175 77,40 37,39 2,73% 
1653 4808,20 2186,28 0,4546988 392,10 178,29 8,15% 
1654 5596,45 2395,01 0,4279518 0,00 0,00 0,00% 
1655 5352,00 2155,67 0,4027782 17,50 7,05 0,33% 
1656 5709,50 2164,39 0,3790853 45,90 17,40 0,80% 
1657 4941,10 1762,92 0,3567862 155,60 55,52 3,15% 
1658 5179,70 1739,34 0,3357988 60,30 20,25 1,16% 
1659 5481,30 1732,34 0,3160459 505,00 159,60 9,21% 
1660 5681,50 1689,99 0,2974550 107,30 31,92 1,89% 
1661 5029,80 1408,13 0,2799576 299,00 83,71 5,94% 
1662 2215,20 583,68 0,2634895 553,90 145,95 25,00% 
1663 3581,60 888,20 0,2479901 672,50 166,77 18,78% 
1664 4637,40 1082,38 0,2334025 923,20 215,48 19,91% 
1665 4090,80 898,64 0,2196729 921,80 202,49 22,53% 
1666 4968,60 1027,26 0,2067510 143,70 29,71 2,89% 
1667 5448,00 1060,12 0,1945892 45,00 8,76 0,83% 













Table II – b  
Damages on land: period after the war 




Discouted Rents at 








  41148,5   572,53566 1,39% 
1669 5238,50 5238,50 1,0000000 25,40 25,40 0,48% 
1670 5403,90 5086,02 0,9411765 5,00 4,71 0,09% 
1671 4741,55 4200,13 0,8858131 0,00 0,00 0,00% 
1672 4774,18 3980,26 0,8337065 0,00 0,00 0,00% 
1673 5224,44 4099,43 0,7846649 0,00 0,00 0,00% 
1674 4117,80 3041,03 0,7385082 81,20 59,97 1,97% 
1675 4849,56 3370,77 0,6950665 0,00 0,00 0,00% 
1676 5354,10 3502,55 0,6541803 11,70 7,65 0,22% 
1677 4945,50 3044,94 0,6156991 522,70 321,83 10,57% 
1678 4513,40 2615,43 0,5794815 264,00 152,98 5,85% 
1679 5444,66 2969,49 0,5453943 0,00 0,00 0,00% 
       
  
Sources:  
           Tables I and II (a, b): SANTOS, R., Sociogénese do Latifúndio Moderno. Mercado, Crises e Mudança Social n a 









      Table III 
     Damages at sea: period of war 

















     847812,78   97348,59352 11,48% 
1624 50,00% 0,000357143 383049,43 0,6666667 255366,29 75123,85 50082,57 19,61% 
1625 50,00% 0,000357143 451403,23 0,4444444 200623,66 12945,56 5753,58 2,87% 
1626 50,00% 0,000357143 415423,44 0,2962963 123088,43 7758,58 2298,84 1,87% 
1627 50,00% 0,000357143 534328,48 0,1975309 105546,37 133362,81 26343,27 24,96% 
1628 70,00% 0,000357143 616500,09 0,1161946 71634,00 58065,15 6746,86 9,42% 
1629 85,00% 0,000357143 829588,36 0,0628079 52104,71 22723,80 1427,23 2,74% 
1630 100,00% 0,000357143 732811,83 0,0314040 23013,19 68209,48 2142,05 9,31% 
1631 102,50% 0,000357143 531896,97 0,0155081 8248,72 69484,17 1077,57 13,06% 
1632 105,00% 0,000357143 590801,04 0,0075649 4469,37 59682,74 451,50 10,10% 
1633 107,50% 0,000357143 654678,65 0,0036458 2386,80 212971,14 776,44 32,53% 
1634 110,00% 0,000357143 471306,87 0,0017361 818,22 119017,51 206,62 25,25% 
1635 120,00% 0,000357143 450644,70 0,0007891 355,61 37559,27 29,64 8,33% 
1636 127,50% 0,000357143 414071,97 0,0003469 143,63 20527,61 7,12 4,96% 
1637    0,0001476 0,00  0,00 0,00% 
1638    0,0000628 0,00  0,00 0,00% 
1639    0,0000267 0,00  0,00 0,00% 
1640    0,0000267 0,00  0,00 0,00% 
1641    0,0000267 0,00  0,00 0,00% 
1642    0,0000267 0,00  0,00 0,00% 
1643    0,0000267 0,00  0,00 0,00% 
1644    0,0000267 0,00  0,00 0,00% 
1645    0,0000267 0,00  0,00 0,00% 
1646    0,0000267 0,00  0,00 0,00% 
1647 75,00% 0,00025 379578,75 0,0000153 5,80 112638,75 1,72 29,67% 




Capital at sea: estimations based on costs of setting up a ship; freight rates per ton and the number of ships annually 
allocated to the sugar fleet, in Leonor F. COSTA, O Transporte no Atlântico e a Companhia Geral do Comércio do Brasil, 
Lisbon, CNCDP, 2002, pp. 175-178; p. 360. 
For data on cargo (prices of sugar only): archive sources quoted in Leonor F. Costa, O Transporte no Atlântico…p. 
241; Frédéric MAURO, Le Portugal, le Brésil et l’Atlantique au XVII ème Siècle, Paris, Fondation Caloust Gulbenkien, 
1983, pp. 298-299; Stuart SCHWARTZ, Sugar Plantations in the Formation of Brazilian Society Bahia, 1550-1835 
(Portuguese edition), São Paulo, Companhia das Letras, 1988, pp. 400-401. 
The capital estimated for each ship sailing on the Portuguese-Brazilian routes took into account a 210-day voyage 
(back and forth) and a rate of optimal exploitation of freight tonnage (for rates of optimal exploitation of freight tonnages, 
Leonor F. Costa, O Transporte… table in p. 319), providing the average value of a sailing ship which also enables the 
estimation of damages according the number of casualties. 
 Casualties:  
Number of ships and cargo (other than sugar) for the period 1624-1636: Joannees LAET, História ou Anais dos Feitos 
da Companhia Privilegiada das Índias Ocidentais, desde o seu começo até ao fim do ano de 1636, Rio de Janeiro, 
Biblioteca Nacional do Rio de Janeiro, 1925, vol. II, pp. 621-636.  
For the period 1647-1648: Ch. BOXER, The Dutch in Brazil, 1624-1654, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1957, Appendix 
III. 







                                                                                Table IV 




1593 – Francisco Carneiro, Relação de todas as rendas deste reino de Portugal, F. Mendes da Luz, (editig and 
footnoting), Lisboa, 1949. 
1607-  Luís Figueiredo Falcão, Livro em que se contem toda a fazenda e real património dos reinos de Portugal, Índia e 
Ilhas adjacentes, printed in Lisboa, 1859 
1612- “Receita e despesa dos almoxarifados do reino”, Lisbon archives,  Ajuda Library, Manuscripts, 51-VI-54, fl. 128-
135. 
1619- Nicolau de Oliveira, Tratado da Grandeza de Lisboa, data provided by V.M. V.M.GODINHO, “Finanças 
públicas e estrutura do Estado” in Ensaios II, Lisboa, Sá da Costa, 1978, pp.31-74. 
1625 – A. HESPANHA, As Vésperas do Leviathan. Instituições e poder político. Portugal, século XVII, Lisboa, 
Almedina, 1994, p.114, 154 and Lisbon archives, Arquivo Histórico Ultramarino, Conselho Ultramarino, 
cod.37.fl.74 
1632- A. HESPANHA, As Vésperas do Leviathan. Instituições e poder político. Portugal, século XVII, Lisboa, 
Almedina, 1994, p.114, p. 156; 
1641- J. Alves DIAS “Um Documento financeiro do século XVII”, Nova História, vol. VII, nº3/4, 1985 and Lisbon 
Archives, Ajuda Library, Manuscripts, 51-VI-19, fl. 127 
1656- Edgar PRESTAGE, Três Consultas do Conselho da Fazenda de 1656 a 1657, Revista de História, nº34, 1920, 
p.9; Lisbon Archives, Ajuda Library, Manuscripts, 51-VI-19, fl 359-364;  
1660 - A. HESPANHA, As Vésperas do Leviathan. Instituições e poder político. Portugal, século XVII, Lisboa, 
Almedina, 1994, p.114, p. 158: Lisbon Archives, Ajuda Library, Manuscripts, 51-VI-19, fl 359-364 
1680- J. Alves DIAS “Um Documento financeiro do século XVII”, Nova História, vol. VII, nº3/4, 1985. 
 
          For the deflation factor (réis/ silver marc): N. VALÉRIO, “Periodização da História Monetária de 
Portugal”, Estudos de Economia, vol. XII, nº1, 1991, p.15. 
1593 1607 1612 1619 1625 1632 1641 1656 1660 1680
"Almoxarifados" 198298447 205680471 228068968 194082000 201112000 175502000 202442429 196608000 197608488
"Ter¨as"(levied on municipalties) 21000000 21000000 21000000 21000000 21000000 22914000 22913264
Maritime Customs 165405500 186500000 185367585 170000000 187230000 250000000 172662378 291833000 341475026
Lisbon excises 50000000 80000000 70000000 75000000 101144000 86000000 100626283 143798000 143792522
Customs along the Spanish Border 46000000 46000000 36000000 34000000 45000000 24033000 24033320
Fisheries 15438060 10686600 10686600 14000000 8100000 8100000 736000 736000 736400
Salt 24000000 203564490 16000000 16000000 14000000 25000000 25000000 88316000 77252863
"Consulado" - maritime customs 55000000 50000000 80000000 70000000 75000000 50000000 50000000 60866858
Domain revenues 75283827 75283827 75283827 75283827 74000000 74000000 4800000 13735000 13735000
Stamp taxes 8475745 1300000 5050000 9700000 9700000 9700000 55928800 10140000 10826387
Royal monopolies (soap and game) 14600000 14600000 14600000 14600000 14600000 2650000
Military Orders in Madeira Island 24240000 21400000 21400000 24221000 19400000 19400000 19400000 19400000 0
Military Orders in Azores 30636734 40000000 40000000 30000000 30244000 30244000 30244000 30244000 55237000
TOTAL  I 492494486 781450898 950021470 759886827 787813827 822546000 752039890 514006729 891757000 951127128
New Taxes for the war of independence:
Dˇcima 680000000 680000000 680000000 200000000
total new indirect taxes 180000000 180000000 180000000
new stamp duties 14000000
excise on sugar 8000000
Monopoly of Tobaco 290052621
"real de ‡gua of Lx"
dˇcima: Atlantic Islands
extra loan of dioceses
House of  Braganza
additional indirect taxes 83061057
seizures 24000000
TOTAL II 1612039890 1374006729 1751757000 1570240806






























































































traditional sources of  revenue
new  taxes 
actual revenue f rom new  taxes
